





Is There an Intrinsic Worth in Animal Life?
Abstract
The article argues that moral autonomy and dignity as intrinsic values are borne only by 
members of mankind, and not by nonhuman animals. Although humans and animals inevit-
ably cohabit nature, they cannot be considered to be united together within a moral commu-
nity. However, animal life and formidable biological diversity are definitely worthy of exist-
ence on our planet, even if one day mankind vanishes from Earth. While animals are clearly 
not agents, they may well be recipients of moral obligations to be met by human agency. 
Treating animals in a decent way is a moral duty to ourselves. Following Kant, this duty is 
justifiable on the grounds that the animal world exhibits a certain analogy to mankind. Cau-
tious concern for the natural world strengthens then our worth as rational beings.
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1. Animals are not persons
Since time immemorial, nature has been traversed by multiple processes of 
evolution. The human species, too, has evolved impressively within it along 
the centuries. What  can be  termed as  the value of nature  is  something ap-
praised and ascribed to nature by human perception and conscience.















See  Onora  O’Neill,  “Necessary  Anthro-
pocentrism  and  Contingent  Speciesism”, 
Symposium  on  “Kant  on  Duties  Regarding 
Non-Rational  Nature”,  Proceedings of the 










nise animals as quasi-moral  agents.3 This  strange elevation  is, nonetheless, 







































But,  if  we  take  the  moral  significance  of  inalienable  worth  seriously,  then 
no comparative assessment of worth is morally acceptable between singular 
bearers of dignity and rights. The  intelligible moral dignity of each person 
as an equal member of humanity is one thing, and it is quite another thing to 
make evaluative considerations on the basis of actual individual abilities and 








































matischer Hinsicht,  Felix  Meiner  Verlag, 
Hamburg 2000, §1, p. 9 (Ak. VII, 127).
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In  being  conscious  of  their  moral  autonomy,  human  beings  shape  a  moral 





































       A person who keeps to these duties possesses rightful honour. Honestas 











his own master beyond reproach. The  implied moral capacity forms  the 
second fundament of human dignity from the angle of right. Thus, dignity 
becomes  a  grounding  principle  of  justifying  acquired  rights,  as  well  as 
external duties, prescribed by law.




























assumption,  however,  it  does  not  follow  that  humans  are  morally  allowed 
to treat animals in all possible ways, unlimitedly and without restraint. Our 
moral obligations towards animals are in general congruous with their own 
animal nature. A range of these obligations also includes a positive exigency 
for good conditions of animal welfare.
On the face of it, both statements are forceful. Animals do indeed have ob-
servable needs, which men and women ought to take seriously into account, 
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3. There is no moral community 
  between humans and animals
Peter Singer argues that the moral principle of equality between humans ob-























which  is  related  to  empirically  detectable  characteristics  of,  for  example, 
animal species. Instead, it consists in the idea of reason (Vernunft) as to the 







Kant  diagnoses  with  sincerity  that  humans  and  animal  species  are  indeed 
somewhat  equated  under  the  genus  of  living organisms.20  If  externally 






















Even with  the most charitable  judgement of nonhuman beings, no  form of 
animal life can reach a self-determined subjectivity vested with the freedom of 
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4. Animal life has an immense value of existence
Animal life and nature have an immensely useful value, immediate or virtual, 











biocentric  standpoint holds  that nature has a value  in  itself  (worth)  simply 
because  it exists as a heavenly body  in  the universe. Supporters of  the so-
called Deep Ecology have preached that there is an element of tremendous 









importance of  these purposes on  the one hand, and  to  the possibility of 
ordinary rejuvenation in nature on the other.
b)  Scientific research of biological diversity and of the natural world enhances 




















cern for the natural world invigorates our worth as rational beings.26 There-











5. A set of basic moral requirements regarding animals
Our  moral  duty  to  protect  nature  stems  from  an  intractable  prerogative  of 
mankind. While we are the sole animal species with a moral conscience, we 
are also the species par excellence that damages nature and animal life in 
irresponsible ways.





within  a  framework of  existent,  possible  or  desirable  relationships with 
them.
b)  Human  agents,  of  course,  have  the  tendency  to  experience  compassion 
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d)  This duty  is  justifiable on  the grounds  that  the animal world exhibits a 
certain analogy to mankind.31 Behaving in mild and humane ways towards 
animals actually involves a duty commensurate with what we owe human-
ity. Moreover, protecting defenceless beings in nature, just as within the 




constitution.  Hurting  animals  diminishes  unnecessarily  and  greatly  our 
preoccupation  with  acting  rightfully  towards  our  fellow  humans  them-
selves;  whoever  utilises  animals  brutally  is  usually  gruesome  in  his/her 
behaviour towards men, women and children as well.





























ings. An adequate protection of Nature could come to fruition in a teleological 
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Constantin Stamatis
Ima li život životinjâ intrinzičnu vrijednost?
Sažetak
U članku se nude argumenti za tezu da samo pripadnici ljudskoga roda, a ne i ne-ljudske živo-
tinje, imaju moralnu autonomiju i dostojanstvo kao intrinzičnu vrijednost. Premda je kohabi-
tacija ljudi i životinja u prirodi neizbježna, njih se ne može smatrati članovima jedne moralne 
zajednice. Međutim, život životinjâ i zastrašujuća biološka raznolikost svakako su vrijedni po-
stojanja na našem planetu, čak i ako bi jednoga dana ljudski rod nestao sa Zemlje. Iako životinje 
zasigurno nisu subjekti, one bi mogle biti objekti moralnih dužnosti koje ljudsko djelovanje 
mora uvažiti. Primjereno postupanje sa životinjama moralna je dužnost prema nama samima. 
Slijedeći Kanta, ovu se dužnost može opravdati na temelju tvrdnje da životinjski svijet pokazuje 
određenu sličnost s ljudskim svijetom. U tom smislu, oprezni obzir spram prirodnoga svijeta 




Hat das Leben der Tiere einen intrinsischen Wert?
Zusammenfassung
In dem Artikel werden Argumente vorgebracht für die These, lediglich Angehörige des Men-
schengeschlechts, und nicht auch die nicht-menschlichen Tiere, hätten moralische Autonomie 
und Würde als einen intrinsischen Wert. Wenngleich die Kohabitation zwischen Menschen 
und Tieren in der Natur unvermeidlich ist, können sie nicht als Mitglieder einer moralischen 
Gemeinschaft erachtet werden. Allerdings sind das Leben der Tiere und die fürchterliche bio-
logische Vielfalt einer Existenz auf unserem Planeten durchaus wert, selbst wenn das Men-
schengeschlecht eines Tages von der Erde verschwinden würde. Obwohl Tiere sicherlich keine 
Subjekte sind, könnten sie Objekte moralischer Pflichten sein, die das menschliche Tun wert-
schätzen muss. Eine angemessene Behandlung der Tiere ist eine moralische Pflicht gegenüber 
uns selbst. Diese Pflicht kann, Kant folgend, aufgrund der Behauptung gerechtfertigt werden, 
die Tierwelt weise eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit mit der Menschenwelt auf. In diesem Sinne stärkt 








La vie des animaux a-t-elle une valeur intrinsèque?
Résumé
L’article propose des arguments en faveur de la thèse selon laquelle seuls les membres du genre 
humain, et non les animaux non humains, ont une autonomie morale et une dignité comme va-
leur intrinsèque. Bien que la cohabitation des êtres humains et des animaux dans la nature soit 
inévitable, ces derniers ne peuvent être considérés comme membres d’une communauté morale. 
Cependant, la vie des animaux et l’effrayante diversité biologique ont absolument une valeur 
d’existence sur notre planète, et cela même si le genre humain vient à disparaître de notre Terre. 
Bien que les animaux ne soient certes pas des sujets, ils peuvent être des objets de devoirs mo-
raux que l’activité humaine doit valoriser. Une approche adéquate envers les animaux constitue 
un devoir moral envers nous-mêmes. Suivant la trace de Kant, ce devoir peut être justifié sur 
la base de l’affirmation selon laquelle le monde animal présente une certaine similarité avec le 
monde humain. En ce sens, une considération avisée envers le monde naturel renforce la valeur 
que nous avons de nous-mêmes comme êtres rationnels.
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